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Abstract
On October 26, 2008, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis, the Central Bank of Kuwait
(CBK) announced that it would support Gulf Bank, the country’s third-largest bank, which
had sustained losses on clients’ derivatives trades. In the same announcement, it said it
would ask the government to guarantee all banking deposits to shore up confidence in banks
and to keep Kuwait’s banking system competitive with those of other countries, including
neighboring Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which had already announced
unlimited deposit guarantees. The legislature passed an unlimited deposit guarantee bill
eight days later. Kuwait did not have an existing deposit insurance system at the time, and
legislators tasked the CBK with its implementation. The guarantee covered a variety of
deposit accounts in Kuwait-based banks, including commercial banks, branches of foreign
banks, banks whose operations were compliant with Islamic Sharia law, and specialized
banks. The CBK did not charge fees for coverage, relying instead on public funds to cover any
payouts. The policy guaranteed a total of 24 billion Kuwaiti dinars (KWD) in deposits in 2009
(USD 84 billion). As of March 2022, Kuwait’s National Assembly had not terminated the
unlimited guarantee. There is no evidence to suggest that a payout event has occurred. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has argued since 2010 that Kuwait should replace the
unlimited guarantee with a permanent deposit insurance system with an appropriate
insurance cap. The IMF has said that the unlimited policy may raise moral hazard concerns
and reduce market discipline on banks. Even so, the IMF says that the guarantee has
contributed to financial stability in the absence of a legal and constitutional environment
that would allow for swift remedial action or resolution of ailing financial institutions.
Keywords: Central Bank of Kuwait, deposit insurance, Global Financial Crisis, Kuwait,
unlimited deposit guarantee

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering account guarantee programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
The effects of the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) spread to Kuwait’s economy in the
second half of 2008, primarily through a
decline in oil prices and production, a staple
of Kuwaiti
economic growth and
government funding, and through the global
liquidity shortage (IMF 2010). The
concomitant fall in investor confidence
helped trigger a sharp reversal in real estate
and equity valuations, which weakened the
Kuwaiti financial system’s balance sheet
(IMF 2010).
On October 23, 2008, Gulf Bank, Kuwait’s
third-largest bank, informed the Central
Bank of Kuwait (CBK) that it would suffer
losses as a result of derivatives and foreign
currency trading on behalf of its clients (CBK
2008a; CBK 2010; IMF 2009). A drop in the
euro’s exchange rate against the US dollar
caused the losses (CBK 2008a). The data on
Gulf Bank’s derivatives transactions were
“off balance sheet entries” that had not
previously been reported to the CBK (CBK
2008a). Gulf Bank’s losses totaled about USD
1.4 billion, and the government ultimately
injected capital worth more than USD 1
billion into the ailing bank (IMF 2009; IMF
2010).

Key Terms
Purpose: To “consolidate confidence in our banking
system and enhance its competitiveness with
banks whose deposits have been guaranteed by
their countries”
Launch Dates

Announcement: October
26, 2008
Authorization:
November 3, 2008
Operation: November 3,
2008

End Dates

Still ongoing

Eligible Institutions

Commercial banks,
foreign bank branches,
Islamic banks, and
specialized banks

Eligible Account(s)

Various deposit
accounts, including
wholesale, retail,
foreign, and domestic

Fees

No fees

Size of Guarantee

Unlimited

Coverage

KWD 24 billion in 2009

Outcomes

No payouts; no fee
revenue generated

On October 26, 2008, the CBK announced the
Kuwait had no existing
Gulf Bank losses and said the Kuwaiti Notable Features
deposit insurance
government would soon submit on an urgent
scheme prior to the
basis a bill guaranteeing all deposits in local
crisis, and the unlimited
banks (CBK 2008a). CBK Governor Salem
guarantee remained in
Abdulaziz Al-Sabah said legislators would
effect as of March 2022
implement the policy to “consolidate
confidence” in the country’s banking system
(CBK 2008a). He also referenced similar deposit guarantees passed in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia in mid-October and said that Kuwait’s guarantee would
“enhance its competitiveness with banks whose deposits have been guaranteed by their
countries” (CBK 2008a). Kuwait’s Council of Ministers, a group of the country’s ministry
leaders, submitted the draft bill to the National Assembly on October 28, 2008 (CBK 2008c),
and legislators passed the law on November 3, 2008 (Kuwait Parliament 2008).
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The CBK implemented the unlimited deposit guarantee, which covered all deposits in all
“local” banks, including commercial banks, branches of foreign banks, banks that operated
in accordance with the provisions of Islamic Sharia law, and specialized banks (CBK 2009;
Kuwait Parliament 2008). The CBK did not charge banks fees, and the Kuwaiti government
would fund any depositor payouts (Kuwait Parliament 2008). It is unclear from available
documentation if the CBK set up an internal governing body to manage potential depositor
disbursements.
If an eligible bank failed, the CBK would gather information about eligible depositors based
on payout terms and conditions that the Ministry of Finance (MoF) created (Kuwait
Parliament 2008). The nature of these requirements is unclear from publicly available
documentation. The MoF would then make payouts from the country’s coffers (Kuwait
Parliament 2008). The law also required a government official to submit to the National
Assembly a report sharing information about the failed bank, the amounts paid to depositors,
how the payments complied with the MoF’s terms and conditions, and how the public would
recover funds from the failed bank (Kuwait Parliament 2008).
At the end of March 2009, 17 local commercial, Islamic, and specialized banks operated in
Kuwait (CBK 2009).
Deposits rose 17% between September 30, 2008, and March 31, 2009, reaching 24.1 billion
Kuwaiti dinars (KWD) (USD 84 billion) on that date (CBK 2009).3 Local-currency deposits
rose 11% and foreign currency deposits rose 72% during this six-month period (CBK 2009).
There is no evidence to suggest that a payout event has occurred.
The National Assembly did not designate an end date for the unlimited deposit guarantee in
the original legislation (Kuwait Parliament 2008). It remained in effect more than a decade
later. Kuwaiti policymakers in 2021 considered lifting the unlimited guarantee and replacing
it with a permanent scheme with an upper limit, but the National Assembly had not passed
such legislation as of March 2022 (Times Kuwait 2021).
Summary Evaluation
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has argued since 2010 that Kuwait needs stronger
crisis management frameworks and financial safety net arrangements (IMF 2019). Still, the
IMF has said that the unlimited deposit guarantee contributes to financial stability in the
absence of such arrangements (IMF 2019).
The IMF has argued that Kuwait should replace the unlimited guarantee with a permanent
deposit insurance scheme with an appropriate insurance cap because the current policy may
raise moral hazard concerns and reduce market discipline on banks (IMF 2010; IMF 2019).
The IMF provided Kuwait technical assistance to get a new deposit insurance scheme up and
running, but as of March 2022, Kuwaiti legislators had not yet passed any changes to the

3

KWD 1 = USD 3.49 on December 31, 2009, per Yahoo Finance.
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country’s 2008 deposit insurance policy (IMF 2019). Making the deposit insurance scheme
Shariah-compliant might have slowed the process, according to the IMF (IMF 2019).
Three Persian Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait—implemented unlimited
guarantees in rapid succession during the GFC. The International Association of Deposit
Insurers (IADI) argues in a 2011 report that regionally integrated economies such as these
may be most susceptible to preemptive, extraordinary measures because they might face
greater contagion risks from outside their home countries (IADI 2011). The report says that
unilateral emergency actions by individual countries in such regions could be “potentially
destabilizing.” It argues that integrated economies would benefit most from bilateral or
multilateral agreements that would make unilateral measures unnecessary (IADI 2011).
These agreements should provide for ongoing coordination, information sharing, early
warning systems, and joint payout simulations (IADI 2011).4
CBK sources told reporters in 2021 that credit rating agencies considered the unlimited
guarantee when determining Kuwait’s sovereign rating (Times Kuwait 2021). Because the
policy could create large obligations on the state, it might negatively impact the country’s
ratings (Times Kuwait 2021).
Kuwaiti banking shares fell after the CBK’s initial unlimited deposit guarantee
announcement (Irish Times 2008; Noueihed 2008). Some journalists called the policy
surprising because the CBK governor had said a week earlier that policymakers would not
enact a deposit guarantee (Irish Times 2008; Noueihed 2008).

The argument for intercountry coordination stems from Principle 7 of the IADI’s 2009 Core Principles for
Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (IADI 2011). The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) helped create
the guidelines in response to the cascade of deposit insurance changes that countries made in response to the
GFC.
4
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Context: Kuwait 2008–2009

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

$147.40 billion in 2008
$105.96 billion in 2009
$55,495 in 2008
$37,562 in 2009

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data not available for 2008
Data not available for 2009
$96.37 billion in 2008
$90.46 billion in 2009
65.38% in 2008
85.37% in 2009
91.24% in 2008
93.38% in 2009
Data not available for 2008
Data not available for 2009
7% in 2008
7% in 2009
Data not available for 2008
Data not available for 2009
Not until new policy in November
2008
Yes, in 2009

Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: Kuwait’s National Assembly passed the unlimited deposit guarantee to
shore up confidence in the country’s banking system after the Central Bank of
Kuwait provided support to a large bank. Legislators also cited competitive
pressures from other Persian Gulf countries that offered full deposit insurance.
The CBK said that the unlimited deposit guarantee would boost confidence in the country’s
banking system and “enhance its competitiveness with banks whose deposits have been
guaranteed by their countries” (CBK 2008a). Neighboring United Arab Emirates and Saudi
Arabia had provided full deposit guarantees in mid-October 2008 (IADI 2011). Still, after
Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s announcements (IADI 2011), CBK officials had initially told the
press that Kuwait would not implement such a guarantee (Irish Times 2008; Noueihed 2008).
It was only after Gulf Bank reported its losses to the CBK that the CBK and then the National
Assembly supported the unlimited deposit guarantee policy.
Kuwait’s government previously guaranteed all bank deposits in the 1980s after the collapse
of the stock market rendered most banks insolvent (Jeffreys 2011). It allowed that guarantee
to expire in 1994 once the financial system had stabilized.
2. Part of a Package: Kuwaiti legislators announced the unlimited deposit guarantee
alongside its financial support to Gulf Bank, but it took no other financial stability
measures at the time. The National Assembly and the CBK intensified their crisisfighting responses in December and early 2009.
The Central Bank of Kuwait announced the unlimited deposit guarantee proposal in the same
press release in which it revealed that it would provide financial support to Kuwait’s thirdlargest bank, Gulf Bank. Gulf Bank had sustained losses resulting from its clients’ transactions
in derivatives contracts (CBK 2008a).
The unlimited deposit guarantee the government announced in October 2008 was not part
of a comprehensive financial stability package, though the CBK had made several relevant
policy changes throughout 2008 (IMF 2009). By the end of the year, the CBK had cut its
benchmark lending rate three times, to 3.75% from 5.75% (CBK 2009).
The CBK and the Kuwaiti government escalated their responses to the financial crisis in
December 2008 and at the start of 2009, when financial and economic pressures intensified
(IMF 2009; IMF 2010). Those measures included:
•

Liquidity injections through CBK repurchase agreement operations, foreign currency
swaps, direct collateralized placements, and government deposits at commercial
banks;

•

A financial stability law that (1) provided full guarantees on banks’ loan-loss
provision shortfalls; (2) guaranteed 50% of bank loans to the productive sectors of
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the economy, with a total allocated guaranteed amount of KWD 2 billion; and (3)
guaranteed 50% of loans to investment companies, along with a revamped legal
framework to allow for methodical restructuring of these companies;5 and
•

The creation of government-financed stock market stabilization funds to support the
Boursa Kuwait (IMF 2010).

3. Legal Authority: Kuwait’s National Assembly passed Law No. 30/2008 to create
the unlimited deposit guarantee.
The National Assembly passed Law No. 30/2008 to establish the unlimited deposit
guarantee (Kuwait Parliament 2008). Legislators empowered the CBK to administer the
guarantee via amended Law No. 32/1968, “Concerning Currency, the Central Bank of Kuwait
and the Regulation of Banking.” The law gives the CBK the power to act in concert6 with
banks to insure deposits (Kuwait Parliament 1968). Although the CBK had this ability,
Kuwait did not have a deposit insurance scheme in place in 2008 (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and
Laeven 2014). Kuwait’s government had insured all deposits between 1986 and 1994 in
response to an earlier crisis.7
Law No. 30/2008 also empowered the MoF to play a key role in the payout process (Kuwait
Parliament 2008).
4. Administration: The CBK implemented the unlimited deposit guarantee. The MoF
also participated in the guarantee scheme’s operation.
The CBK administered the guarantee, though it is unclear from available documentation if
the CBK set up an internal governing body to manage a potential payout event. A board of
directors oversaw the CBK’s general affairs (Kuwait Parliament 1968).
Law No. 32/1968 vests the CBK board governor with the authority to manage CBK
operations, issue regulations and instructions, and implement laws and policies, such as the
unlimited deposit guarantee, within the CBK’s purview (Kuwait Parliament 1968).
The 2008 law required the MoF to fund payouts if an eligible bank failed (Kuwait Parliament
2008).

The IMF reports that, as of April 2010: (1) banks were fully provisioned and none had requested the asset
guarantee; (2) banks had extended just KWD 87 million in guaranteed loans; and (3) only one investment
company had applied for bankruptcy protection (IMF 2010).
6 According to an external reviewer to this case, this CBK ability was enabled by Decree Law No. (130) of 1977,
which amended article 40 of Law No. 32/1968.
7 According to an external reviewer to this case, Kuwait’s stock market collapsed during the Almanakh financial
crisis, which led the government to guarantee deposits in local banks in 1986 as part of the "Difficult Credit
Facilities Settlement Program." Paragraph (1) of clause nine of the program stated that "the state is committed
to maintaining the integrity of the financial positions of Kuwaiti banks in a way that ensures that the rights of
shareholders declared on December 31, 1985, are not violated, and the state guarantees the rights of depositors
with these banks." The government canceled this guarantee in 2004 after it was viewed as no longer needed.
5
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5. Governance: A board of directors governed the CBK. Law No. 30/2008 required
that a government official submit to the National Assembly a report about any
payout event.
A board of directors managed the CBK’s general affairs (Kuwait Parliament 1968). A
governor, a deputy governor, an MoF representative, a Ministry of Commerce and Industry
(MoCI) representative, and four other members made up the board (Kuwait Parliament
1968).
The emir, Kuwait’s head of state, appointed the governor and deputy governor for five-year
terms and the four additional board members for three-year terms, based on MoF
recommendations (Kuwait Parliament 1968). Kuwaiti law requires that the four individuals
have experience in economics, finance, or banking (Kuwait Parliament 1968). The Council of
Ministers appointed the representatives of the MoF and of the MoCI (Kuwait Parliament
1968). Board members could not be, at the time of appointment, a director or manager of
any Kuwaiti local bank (Kuwait Parliament 1968).
The law establishing the unlimited guarantee required that a government official submit a
report to the National Assembly detailing the deposits covered if a payout event occurred
(Kuwait Parliament 2008). According to an external reviewer to this case, this government
official was, in practice, the CBK.
The record had to include information about the failed bank, the amounts paid to depositors,
and how the public would recover funds from the failed bank (Kuwait Parliament 2008). Law
No. 30/2008 also required that the report include information about how the payments
complied with a set of terms and conditions that the MoF created and approved and that the
CBK board of directors helped create (Kuwait Parliament 2008). The nature of these terms
and conditions is unclear from publicly available documentation.
6. Communication: CBK officials and Kuwait’s National Assembly said the
government passed the unlimited guarantee to shore up confidence in the
domestic banking sector and to keep Kuwaiti banks competitive.
Kuwaiti legislators in the formal legal text said they passed the unlimited guarantee to
ensure Kuwaiti banks remained competitive in an environment where other governments
had implemented similar policies (Kuwait Parliament 2008). Policymakers did not announce
their intentions to pass the guarantee until Gulf Bank’s financial struggles became public
knowledge. In its press releases, the CBK discussed the unlimited guarantee in the context of
Gulf Bank’s imminent financial losses and its plans to back the bank with liquidity injections
if necessary.
On October 26, 2008, the CBK announced that Gulf Bank would incur financial losses on its
clients’ derivative transactions (CBK 2008a). CBK Governor Al-Sabah emphasized that the
central bank would back Gulf Bank financially, as well as its depositors, and that the
government planned to submit an emergency bill guaranteeing all Kuwaiti deposits (CBK
2008a). Al-Sabah stressed that the banking system was sound and that the government
wanted to enact the bill to bolster public confidence and to keep Kuwaiti banks competitive
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with institutions whose deposits had been guaranteed in full by other governments (CBK
2008a). Kuwaiti banking shares fell after the CBK’s initial unlimited deposit guarantee
announcement (Irish Times 2008; Noueihed 2008). Some journalists called the policy
surprising because the CBK governor had said a week earlier that policymakers would not
enact a deposit guarantee (Irish Times 2008; Noueihed 2008).
The next day, the CBK said it had examined all other domestic banks and that none would
suffer losses because of Gulf Bank (CBK 2008b). CBK officials emphasized that they were
prepared to pump liquidity into Gulf Bank if necessary and again reiterated that the
government planned to submit an unlimited deposit guarantee to bolster public confidence
and to keep Kuwaiti banks competitive (CBK 2008b). That day, Al-Sabah told the public on
CNBC Arabiya TV that the CBK was “committed to supporting banks and the safety of their
financial status" (Central Banking Staff 2008).
On November 9, 2008, six days after the National Assembly passed Law No. 30/2008
establishing the unlimited guarantee, Al-Sabah told news outlet KUNA that the policy had
“no time limit . . . It will continue until world markets [stabilize] and repercussions of the
crisis are digested” (Khaleej Times 2008).
7. Size of Guarantees: The CBK guaranteed all deposits by eligible accounts in eligible
institutions.
The guarantee covered all depositor funds held in eligible accounts, and there was no
government-imposed funding limit (Kuwait Parliament 2008). Deposits in covered banks
totaled KWD 21 billion at the end of 2008 and KWD 24 billion at the end of 2009 (CBK 2010).
8. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The CBK did not charge insured banks a fee, and
the Kuwaiti government would fund any depositor payouts from its reserve fund.
Law No. 30/2008 stipulated that the MoF would reimburse eligible deposits from the
country’s General Reserve Fund, which covers Kuwaiti government outlays (Kuwait
Parliament 2008). Kuwait imposes minimal taxes on corporations and collects no personal
income tax (IMF 2016). The state’s oil revenues and investment income fund the General
Reserve (Kuwait Investment Authority 2022).
There is no evidence to suggest that the Kuwaiti government has had to reimburse
depositors after any bank failure since 2008.
9. Eligible Institutions: The CBK guaranteed deposits at all “local” Kuwaiti banks.
Law No. 30/2008 reads that the government covered all deposits in “local” banks (Kuwait
Parliament 2008). Local banks included commercial banks, branches of foreign banks, banks
that operate in accordance with the provisions of Islamic Sharia law, and specialized banks
(CBK 2009).
At the end of March 2009, 17 local commercial, Islamic, and specialized banks operated in
Kuwait, with deposits totaling KWD 24.1 billion (CBK 2009).
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10. Eligible Accounts: The CBK guaranteed all kinds of deposits in eligible institutions,
including foreign currency deposits.
The CBK guaranteed deposits of all kinds, including wholesale, retail, foreign, and domestic
(IMF 2017; Kuwait Parliament 2008). Total deposits in covered banks totaled KWD 20.7
billion on September 30, 2008, and KWD 24.1 billion on March 31, 2009 (CBK 2009). Foreign
currency deposits rose from KWD 1.8 billion to KWD 3.1 billion over that six-month period
(CBK 2009).
11. Fees: The CBK did not collect fees from eligible institutions.
The Kuwaiti government took full financial responsibility for any deposit payout event (CBK
2008d).
12. Process for Exercising Guarantee: After a bank failed, the CBK would gather
information about eligible depositors, and the MoF would pay them.
After an eligible bank failed, the CBK would gather information about eligible depositors
based on certain payout terms and conditions (Kuwait Parliament 2008). The MoF created
and approved these terms and conditions, which the CBK board of directors helped create
(Kuwait Parliament 2008). The nature of these requirements is unclear from publicly
available documentation.
The MoF would then make payouts from the General Reserve Fund (Kuwait Parliament
2008). The law also required a government official to submit to the National Assembly a
report sharing information about the failed bank, the amounts paid to depositors, how the
payments complied with MoF’s terms and conditions, and how the public would recover
funds from the failed bank (Kuwait Parliament 2008). Details about how the government
would or could recover funds from the failed bank are unclear from available documents.
13. Other Restrictions on Eligible Institutions/Accounts: Legislators did not impose
restrictions on eligible institutions or accounts.
Law No. 30/2008 did not impose restrictions on institutions outside normal regulatory
requirements. But the CBK did examine all domestic banks in the wake of Gulf Bank’s
financial losses and said that none would suffer losses because of Gulf Bank (CBK 2008b).
14. Duration: The Kuwaiti government did not initially set an expiration date for the
unlimited guarantee, and as of March 2022, had not revoked the policy.
The National Assembly did not designate an end date for the unlimited deposit guarantee in
the original November 2008 legislation (Kuwait Parliament 2008). Days after the National
Assembly passed Law No. 30/2008 establishing the unlimited guarantee, CBK Governor AlSabah told news outlet KUNA that the policy had “no time limit . . . It will continue until world
markets [stabilize] and repercussions of the crisis are digested” (Khaleej Times 2008). As of
March 2022, it remained in effect more than a decade later (Kuwait Parliament 2008).
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Policymakers considered lifting the government guarantee in 2021, but as of March 2022,
the National Assembly had not yet passed legislation ending the program (Times Kuwait
2021).
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